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I. INTRODUCTION
A lawyer who accepts the responsibility of trying a case has the
affirmative responsibility to clearly understand and follow rules
governing closing argument.'
In the presentation of a case to a jury, one must be mindful that ultimate
effectiveness is determined by an unbiased group of laymen who are not likely
trained in law. Thus, arguments must be presented in a concise, easily under-
stood manner. Although a lawyer may have spun the most impenetrable legal
I Gary D. Fox, Objectionable Closing Argument: Cases and Solutions, FLA. B.J., Dec. 1996,
at 43.
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web, if a jury is unable to follow the logic, the argument is necessarily futile.
Again, effectiveness lies in the minds of the jury.
The closing argument is an attorney's final occasion to present his or
her client's case to the jury, one last attempt to explain the merits. Closing ar-
gument has been described as "the most significant vehicle for in-court attorney
communication."2 Indeed, "the closing argument in the hands of a master can
attain the loftiest plane of human communication and can move the trier of fact
to the speaker's will."
3
Nevertheless, counsel must be aware that although this is an opportunity
to speak virtually at will, there are some potential pitfalls that could jeopardize
the case. This Note, therefore, is aimed at informing West Virginia practitioners
of the existence of these forbidden arguments in civil cases. Part II explains the
procedural characteristics, including an examination of closing argument error
preservation and the standard of review. Part III details and categorizes those
arguments that have been deemed impermissible by the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals (the "Court"). Finally, Part IV concludes this Note, offering a
brief review of the arguments and some suggestions for practitioners.
II. PROCEDURAL CHARACTERISTICS
Like most other areas of law, closing argument error preservation and
review has its own set of rules. Thus, these vastly important procedural charac-
teristics are the aim of this section.
Ordinarily, an objection by the opposing party is necessary to preserve
the issue for appeal.4 "A litigant may not silently acquiesce to an alleged error,
or actively contribute to such error, and then raise that error as a reason for re-
versal on appeal.",5 Failure to make a timely and proper objection to remarks of
counsel made in the presence of the jury during the trial of a case constitutes a
waiver of the right to raise the question thereafter, either in the trial court or in
the appellate court.6 One of the primary purposes of this contemporaneous ob-
jection rule is to afford the trial court an opportunity to instruct counsel to re-
frain from further improper comment while subsequently instructing the jury to
disregard such conjecture.7
2 Valerie P. Hans & Krista A. Sweigart, Jurors' Views of Civil Lawyers: Implications for
Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L.J. 1297, 1303 (1993).
3 H. Mitchell Caldwell et al., The Art and Architecture of Closing Argument, 76 TUL. L. REV.
961, 965 (2002).
4 Yuncke v. Welker, 36 S.E.2d 410 (W. Va. 1945).
5 Syl. Pt. 1, Maples v. W. Va. Dep't Commerce, 475 S.E.2d 410 (W. Va. 1996).
6 Id.
7 See, e.g., Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1998).
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Nevertheless, the general requirement of contemporaneous objection
has been relaxed significantly by the enactment of West Virginia Trial Court
Rule 23.04(b).8 This rule suggests broad limitations on closing arguments and
also specifically disfavors objections by counsel. 9 As a practical matter, the
"relaxation" of the contemporaneous objection rule may simply provide the
court with a means of justification for its case-by-case determination of whether
the argument at issue constitutes reversible error. Therefore, the prudent lawyer
should most likely object when faced with an argument that may be question-
able.
However, even if an attorney should fail to object, he or she may find
solace in the clear potential for judicial activism by the Court. For example,
although the Court has suggested that some lines of argument require an objec-
tion to preserve the issue, it has nonetheless reversed in the absence of objec-
tion.'0 Furthermore, some arguments have been deemed so prejudicial or con-
trary to the interests of justice that their very existence constitutes plain error."
Rule 103(d) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence permits a court to take "no-
8 Rowe v. Sisters of the Pallotine Missionary Soc'y, 560 S.E.2d 491, 502 (Davis, J., dissent-
ing).
9 See W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 23.04(b). In pertinent part, the rule provides:
Counsel may refer to the instructions to juries in their argument, but may not
argue against the correctness of any instruction. The court in its discretion
may reread one or more of the instructions. Counsel may not comment upon
any evidence ruled out, nor misquote the evidence, nor make statements of
fact dehors the record, nor contend before the jury for any theory of the case
that has been overruled. Counsel shall not be interrupted in argument by op-
posing counsel, except as may be necessary to bring to the court's attention
objection to any statement to the jury made by opposing counsel and to obtain
a ruling on such objection. No portion of a lawbook shall be read to the jury
by counsel.
Id.
10 See, e.g., Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hosp., 345 S.E.2d 791, 798-99 (W. Va. 1986) (reducing
a jury award from ten million to three million dollars despite defense counsel's failure to object at
trial).
I See, e.g., Honaker v. Mahon, 552 S.E.2d 788, 795 (W. Va. 2001). This practice differs
from that found in other states in which there is a bright-line rule that if there is no objection, the
error is waived. See, e.g., Copeland v. City of Yuma, 772 P.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1989); Kempner v. Schulte, 885 S.W.2d 892, 894 (Ark. 1994); Rego Co. v. McKown-Katy, 801
P.2d 536, 540 (Colo. 1990); Whitley v. Gwinnett County, 470 S.E.2d 724, 730 (Ga. Ct. App.
1996); Johnson v. Emerson, 647 P.2d 806, 811 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (finding that objection to
improper closing argument is timely if made before case is submitted to the jury); Siler v. City of
Kansas City, 505 P.2d 765, 766 (Kan. 1973) (finding that improper closing argument was not
available as basis for reversing judgment where counsel for the party seeking relief did not object,
request a curative instruction, or move for a mistrial based on such improper argument); Cooper v.
United S. Assurance Co., 718 So. 2d 1029, 1037-39 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
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tice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to
the attention of the court."'
' 2
Even so, practitioners should not make a practice of relying on the
Court to act in the absence of an objection, as it has outwardly expressed a great
unwillingness to enact the plain error doctrine except in extreme cases.13 In so
doing, it has explained that in order to receive the benefit of the plain error doc-
trine, "there must be (1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial
rights; and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the
judicial proceedings."' 4 Given these rather stringent requirements, an objection
should certainly be made in order to prevent the Court from dismissing the ap-
peal summarily.
Assuming the appeal receives more than a cursory treatment, the stan-
dard of review applied by the Court is abuse of discretion by the circuit court in
either permitting or disallowing the argument.' 5 Although "a trial court has
broad discretion in controlling argument before the jury,"' 6 such "authority does
not go unchecked."' 17 Therefore, when the Court finds the lower court has
abused its discretion, it will not hesitate to right the wrong that has been com-
mitted. 8
III. IMPERMISSIBLE ARGUMENTS
This section points out and categorizes some particular arguments that
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has warned against or deemed
impermissible. The classifications are presented as a practical method for un-
derstanding and should not be viewed as concrete, unyielding demarcations.
For the sake of simplicity and clarity, the impermissible arguments have been
placed into three broad categories: value arguments, practical effects argu-
ments, and legally unsound arguments.
12 W. VA. R. EvID. 103(d).
13 As previously noted, however, this "great unwillingness" may ultimately depend on the
underlying merits of the case, rather than a technical objection requirement, as this somewhat
amorphous area of the law is subject to judicial activism. See Roberts, 345 S.E.2d at 798-99.
14 Syl. Pt. 7, State v. Miller, 459 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1996). This doctrine has equal applica-
tion in civil cases. E.g., Honaker, 552 S.E.2d at 795 (applying this same test in a dispute arising
from an automobile accident).
15 See, e.g., Lacy v. CSX Transp., Inc., 520 S.E.2d 418,427 (W. Va. 1999).
16 Dawson v. Casey 364 S.E.2d 43,47 (W. Va. 1987).
17 Lipscomb v. Tucker County Comm'n, 527 S.E.2d 171, 174 (W. Va. 1999).
18 Rollyson v. Jordan, 518 S.E.2d 372, 383 (W. Va. 1999).
[Vol. 106
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A. The Value Arguments
This section details those impermissible arguments that relate to dam-
ages. In this area, there exist many potential obstacles of which a lawyer must
be aware. An overriding theme of this section is that the lawyer who is overly
specific regarding requests for damages jeopardizes his or her case. Although
some jurors may feel that specific requests or calculation guides aid the deci-
sional process, the Court has consistently found them objectionable, as this sec-
tion bears out. And because damages are almost always the main goal of a civil
suit, this is a most important consideration.
1. Mathematical Formula to Calculate Damages
In Crum v. Ward,19 the Court stated,
In an action for damages for personal injuries, an argument of
counsel to the jury based on a mathematical formula, or fixed-
time basis, suggesting a money value for pain and suffering is
not based on facts, or reasonable inferences arising from facts,
before the jury, and constitutes reversible error.2°
Such an argument is sometimes referred to as the per diem, unit of time, black-
board, or mathematical formula method for determining the value of pain and
suffering. 2' This line of conjecture, though impermissible, does require an ob-
jection in order to preserve the issue for appeal.22
Crum involved an automobile accident in which the plaintiff was rear-
ended by the defendant who was driving a tractor-trailer.23 Plaintiff's injuries
caused her to spend a week in the hospital, and, according to her expert wit-
nesses, she would continue to experience pain and suffering for the remainder of
her life. 4 Accordingly, plaintiff's counsel presented to the jury a formula that
he suggested would adequately compensate the plaintiff for her injuries. 25
Plaintiffs counsel was permitted to write on a blackboard that the plaintiff was
in the hospital for a total of fifteen days, for which he asked the jury to compen-
sate in the amount of one hundred dollars per day. He then opined that the time
19 122 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1961).
20 Id. at 20, Syl. Pt. 5.
21 Id. at 23.
22 Id. (noting that, although the argument was both timely and sufficiently objected to by de-
fense counsel, the trial court allowed this line of argument).
23 Id. at 20-21.
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between the accident and trial, a period of 301 days, should be worth twenty-
five dollars per day. Finally, plaintiffs counsel posited that plaintiff would ex-
perience pain, suffering, and an inability to engage in normal activities for the
remainder of her life expectancy, an expectancy that was speculated to be a pe-
riod of 12,676 days based on expert testimony. For this, he requested three dol-
lars per day. Adding these amounts on the blackboard, he came to a total re-
quested amount of $47,053.
Significantly, plaintiffs counsel informed the jury that the figures he
presented were merely his calculations and that the jury itself was to come up
with its own measure of damages based on the evidence.26 Specifically, he told
the jury, "I will set my own evaluation and you take your own, but I will set my
own and leave it with you as a guide" and "I will place my value and you place
your own,"27 The jury at trial returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for only
$11,000.28 Nonetheless, the argument by plaintiffs counsel regarding a set
formula was found to be reversible error 29 because "[t]here is and there can be
no fixed basis, table, standard, or mathematical rule which will serve as an accu-
rate index and guide to the establishment of damage awards for personal inju-
ries., 30 The Court explained that although the verdict should not be disturbed
where no prejudice exists, this rule favoring deference to the trial court's deci-
sion could not be applied where such a mathematical formula was erroneously
permitted.31
There was a split of authority on whether such arguments should be
permitted at trial when this case was presented to the Court. 32 In fact, the dis-
senting opinion in Crum outlined the arguments both in favor of and in opposi-
tion to advancing such arguments at trial.33 The majority thought, however, that
26 Id.
27 Id. at 22.
28 Id. at 20. It should be pointed out, however, that the effect of contributory negligence was
also at issue in the case, so the jury award may have been reduced proportionately. Id.
29 Id. at 27.
30 Id. at 24.
31 Id. at 23-24.
32 See, e.g., Olsen v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 354 P.2d 575 (Utah 1960).
33 Crum, 122 S.E.2d at 31-33 (Haymond, Pres., dissenting).
The reasons ... in opposition to such argument are in substance: (1) That there
is no evidentiary basis for converting pain and suffering into monetary terms;
(2) that it is improper for counsel to suggest a total amount for pain and suffer-
ing, and therefore wrong to suggest per diem amounts; (3) that to do so
amounts to the attorney giving testimony and expressing opinions and conclu-
sions on matters not disclosed by the evidence; (4) that juries frequently are
misled by such argument to make excessive awards and that admonitions of the
court that the jury should not consider such argument as evidence do not erase
all their prejudicial effect; and (5) that after such argument a defendant is
[Vol. 106
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the introduction of this argument may have improperly prejudiced the jury's
deliberations and thus found this to be reversible error. West Virginia has since
remained steadfast in its opposition to such arguments.34
2. The "Racehorse Analogy"
As surprising as it may be, drawing an analogy between the value of
losing a racehorse and that of losing a loved one has been a tactic employed in
West Virginia on more than one occasion. In Roberts v. Stevens Clinic Hospi-
tal,35 an action was brought under West Virginia Code section 55-7-6 for the
wrongful death of a two-and-a-half year old child resulting from medical mal-
practice.36 Plaintiffs counsel argued that if a racehorse worth ten million dol-
lars was killed through the defendant's negligence, the measure of damages
would be this very amount.37 Plaintiff's counsel also made other comparisons in
prejudiced by being placed in the position of attempting to rebut an argument
which is not based on the evidence, that if he does not answer in kind the ar-
gument of counsel for the plaintiff he suffers from its effect on the jury, and
that if he so answer he impliedly approves that type of argument in evaluating
a monetary recovery for pain and suffering as an element of damages.
Id. at 32-33 (Haymond, Pres., dissenting).
The reasons stated in the same opinion in favor of such argument are in sub-
stance: (i) That it is necessary that the jury be guided by some reasonable and
practical considerations; (2) that a trier of facts should not be required to deter-
mine the matter in the abstract or to do so by a blind guess; (3) that the absence
of a yardstick at least makes questionable the contention that the suggestion of
a monetary amount misleads the jury; (4) that the argument that the evidence
fails to provide a foundation for per diem suggestion is unconvincing because
the jury must, by that or some other process of reasoning, estimate and allow a
proper amount for pain and suffering or other like element of damages; (5) that
the suggestion by council that the evidence as to pain and suffering justifies al-
lowance of a certain amount, in total or per diem figures, does no more than
present one method of reasoning which the trier of facts may employ to aid him
in making a reasonable and sane estimate; (6) that such per diem argument is
not evidence and is used only as an illustration and suggestion; (7) that the as-
serted danger of such suggestion being mistaken for evidence is an exaggera-
tion, and that such danger, if present, can be dispelled by an instruction by the
court; and (8) that when counsel for one side has made such argument opposing
counsel is equally free to suggest his own amounts as inferred by him from the
evidence relating to the condition for which damages are sought.
Id. at 33 (Haymond, Pres., dissenting) (citing Ratner v. Arrington, Ill So. 2d 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959)).
34 See, e.g., Foster v. Sakhai, 559 S.E.2d 53, 67 (W. Va. 2001); Hewett v. Frye, 401 S.E.2d
222, 225-26 (W. Va. 1990).
35 345 S.E.2d 791 (W. Va. 1986).
36 Id. at 793.
37 Id. at 799.
2004]
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seeking an amount sufficient to compensate the parents for their loss, including
references to winning the lottery and to the vast sums of money spent on the
space program.38 Notably, the jury awarded ten million dollars.
On appeal, the Court decided that the jury could have only concluded
that its duty was to evaluate the deceased child's life and apply a monetary value
thereto.39  Although no objection was made by the defense, thus technically
waiving the error, the Court felt compelled to reduce the jury's award of ten
million dollars to three million, concluding that the closing argument was not
entirely consistent with the wrongful death statute or the trial court's instruc-
tions.40
While Roberts may have ultimately been decided on the fact that the ar-
guments presented were not in accord with the applicable statute, there is further
evidence that a "racehorse analogy" is impermissible. In Rowe v. Sisters of the
Pallotine Missionary Society,4' the Court summarily skirted over the issue of the
racehorse analogy, stating that the appellant's failure to object at trial effectively
waived the issue.42 Justice Davis, however, dissented on this point, noting the
record reflected that the issue had been properly preserved.43 The dissent went
on to specifically cite Roberts, adding that the analogy presented here "was ex-
pressly disapproved in Roberts."" Thus, it is clear that the use of such an anal-
ogy may be perilous and could constitute reversible error if properly preserved
and appealed.
3. Suggesting a Verdict Amount for Non-Economic Damages
Similar to the preceding class of arguments, this class of argument also
deals with suggesting an amount to the jury without any reasonable basis for the
amount suggested. The rule was most succinctly stated in Bennett v. 3 C Coal
38 Id. In total, it seems that counsel presented several different situations that involved great
sums of money in order to impress upon the jury that a multi-million dollar verdict may not be out
of line with the parents' actual loss.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 798-99.
41 560 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 2001).
42 Id. at 501 n.6.
43 Id. at 501. (Davis, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Justice Davis went to great
lengths to spell out exactly how the objection had been made, the ruling of the trial court, and how
the objection was within the requirements of Rule 23.04(b). Id. at 502-03 (Davis, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). This situation is indicative of a practitioner's difficulty in knowing ex-
actly what is required and what is sufficient for preservation. Thus, as a practical matter, lawyers
should strive for clarity and thoroughness in order to avoid meeting the same fate as the appellants
in Rowe.
44 Id. at 502.
[Vol. 106
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Co.45 where the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held, in part, that dis-
closure to the jury of the amount requested in the complaint as compensation for
non-economic damages would result in reversible error where the jury's verdict
was obviously influenced by the amount suggested.46 The suit was brought over
the disturbance of a family gravesite, allegedly brought about by mining subsi-
dence.47 Plaintiff s counsel requested that the jury return a verdict in the amount
of $500,000 in punitive damages on top of the initial $500,000 requested as
compensatory damages because the defendant's acts were done "intentionally,
knowingly and willfully. 48 Defense counsel objected and requested that the
jury not be advised of any particular monetary amount.49 The trial court over-
ruled the objections, finding the suggestion of such an amount not seriously
50prejudicial or error per se.
The Court, however, disagreed. 5' Although disclosing to the jury the
amount sued for may not always be reversible error,52 the better practice is to
avoid mentioning such amounts.53 The Bennett decision seems to indicate that
the Court will review such arguments on a case-by-case basis, as it listed four
case-specific reasons why the suggestion of damages in this case amounted to
reversible error.5 4 Specifically, the Court explained that this suggestion was
prejudicial because: 1) the entire damage award was predicated on the mental
distress of the plaintiff; 2) the amount requested was mentioned in both the
opening and closing arguments; and 3) the jury was not instructed as to how to
calculate compensatory or punitive damages.55 Most significant, however, was
the fact that the jury was so obviously influenced by the suggestion from plain-
tiffs counsel.56
The Court has clearly recognized that suggesting an amount to the jury
should be avoided. However, the simple fact that such a figure is suggested
does not necessarily ensure that the verdict will be reversed on appeal. This
45 379 S.E.2d 388 (W. Va. 1989).
46 ld. at 397.
47 Id. at 390.
48 Id. at 395. This argument was presented by plaintiffs counsel in both his opening statement
and closing argument.
49 Id.
50 Id. at n.7.
51 Id. at 397.
52 See Jordan v. Bero, 210 S.E.2d 618, 619 (W. Va. 1974).
53 Id.
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logic was best expressed when the Court explained that in "recognizing the
proper function of the jury and, also, that damage awards in personal injury ac-
tions are necessarily somewhat indeterminate in character and amount, this
Court, while not approving exposition of ad damnum clauses to the jury, does
not reverse for this impropriety alone. 57 The Court has, however, cautioned
attorneys that "while the impropriety of such argument is not prejudicial per se,
it cannot be disregarded in considering the broader question of whether the ver-
dict was excessive when compared with competent proof of damages. 58 There-
fore, even if the comment is not prejudicial in and of itself, such disclosure may
contribute to reversal if the jury verdict is not supported by the evidence.
4. Arguments Related to a "Cap" on Damages
Counsel should also be wary of seeking the "cap amount" on damages
as the "target" for the jury's award. In Foster v. Sakhai,59 the trial court ordered
a new trial after plaintiffs counsel impermissibly requested that the cap on
damages be the very amount awarded by the jury. 60 Specifically, counsel stated
that with regard to damages related to "loss of enjoyment of life, mental an-
guish, [and] ... fright.., the Court has instructed that whatever those items you
have, a million dollars is the total. It cannot be above a million dollars, so that's
the target.",
6 1
On appeal, the issuance of a new trial was reversed, as the Court deter-
mined that allowing a new trial on this basis "would produce 'manifest injus-
tice.' 62 Noting that "[m]istrials in civil cases are generally regarded as the most
drastic remedy and should be reserved for the most grievous error,' 63 the Court
thought that the jury was adequately informed and understood that the million
dollar figure constituted the upper limit for any award, not a "target. ' 64
Even so, the Court explained that it was "concerned that counsel's re-
marks could potentially be interpreted as a suggestion that the million dollar
figure was a floor. '65 Therefore, it is likely that, given the proper case and facts,
57 Jordan, 210 S.E.2d at 629; see, e.g., Ferguson v. R.E. Ball & Co., 173 S.E.2d 83 (W. Va.
1970); Peck v. Bez, 40 S.E.2d I (W. Va. 1946); Nees v. Julian Goldman Stores, Inc., 154 S.E. 769
(W. Va. 1930); Looney v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 135 S.E. 262 (W. Va. 1926); Keathley v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 102 S.E. 244 (W. Va. 1919).
58 Abdulla v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 213 S.E.2d 810, 823 (W. Va. 1975).
59 559 S.E.2d 53 (W. Va. 2001).
60 Id. at 65.
61 Id. (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 66.
63 Id. at 65-66 (citing Pasquale v. Ohio Power Co., 418 S.E.2d 738, 742 (W. Va. 1992)).
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the Court would find the suggestion of a statutory cap to be prejudicial error and
reverse a jury verdict. Furthermore, the rationale of disallowing this line of rea-
soning would be very similar to the preceding class of arguments and could be
justified thereon. It cannot be argued that seeking to recover the "cap amount"
and suggesting an amount for non-economic damages are so entirely different
that one constitutes prejudicial error while the other does not. Quite simply, the
two are too similar to justify such a radical distinction. Thus, counsel would be
wise to be cautious in this area. Again, the argument must be based on some
competent proof of damages.
B. The Practical Effects Arguments
This class of argument asks jurors to consider the "practical effects" of
their decision. In so doing, practitioners place before the jury improper consid-
erations that generally tend to remove the focus from the applicable law and
evidence presented at trial to emotional, personal, or technical considerations.
Because the Court has indicated that such misguidance of the jury is impermis-
sible, the cautious attorney should avoid these arguments.
1. Arguing the Effects of Joint and Several Liability
Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, "[a] plaintiff may elect
to sue any or all of those responsible for his injuries and collect his damages
from whomever is able to pay, irrespective of their percentage of fault."66 Ex-
pressing this fact to the jury, however, is suspect at best.
In Lacy v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,67 plaintiff Lacy was a back-seat
passenger in a vehicle driven by her daughter, Cacoe Sullivan. 68 During the
event in question, Sullivan ran a stop sign, went around a lowered gate arm onto
the railroad tracks, and was struck by one of the defendant's trains, which was
traveling approximately fifty miles per hour. 69 From Sullivan's view, there were
two locomotives traveling on the tracks at the same time, one moving faster than
the other.7° Plaintiffs' theory of liability regarding CSX was that the railroad
was negligent in allowing both fast-moving and slow-moving trains to approach
the crossing in question simultaneously on its main-line tracks. 71 This, the
plaintiffs maintained, caused the warning system to be ineffective, as local resi-
66 Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 679, 684 (W. Va. 1982).
67 520 S.E.2d 418 (W. Va. 1999).
68 Id. at 423. The other passengers in the car were Richard Brooks (Sullivan's fiancde) and the
couple's infant son, who sat in the back with Ms. Lacy. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 423-24.
71 Id. at 424.
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dents had become accustomed to prolonged waits based on slow-moving
72trains.
Prior to trial, CSX proposed a jury instruction that sought to inform the
jury of the effects of joint and several liability, arguing that the instruction was
necessary for the jury to understand the potential results of their verdict.73 The
trial court refused this instruction but decided to allow counsel for the defense to
"argue joint and several liability and 'point out the intrigue.' '174 Plaintiffs' coun-
sel objected and was overruled.75 During closing arguments, defense counsel
argued that the familial relationship between those involved in the accident
would prevent Lacy from seeking to collect from her daughter; therefore, any
liability found on behalf of CSX would, in essence, render the railroad totally
responsible for the accident.76 Despite this conjecture, the jury determined that
Sullivan was ninety-seven percent negligent; CSX was one percent negligent;
and, inexplicably, that Lacy and Brooks, mere passengers in the car, were each
also one percent negligent.77
Despite a split of authority on whether informing juries of the effects of
joint and several liability is permissible,78 the Court held that
72 Id. Plaintiffs alleged that CSX's flawed warning system "resulted in the activation of the
crossing's flashing lights and gate arms when no trains were in hazardous proximity." Id. Appar-
ently, plaintiffs attempted to justify Sullivan's actions by asserting that in lieu of waiting an inor-
dinate amount of time for the crossing's gate arms to go up, her evasive maneuvers were reason-
able due to previous encounters with slow moving trains.
73 Id. at 426. The requested instruction stated: "You are instructed that West Virginia recog-
nizes the principle of law known as joint and several liability, which provides that any party
against whom a finding of negligence is made can be held responsible for the entire verdict." Id.
at 426 n.9.
74 Id. at 426.
75 Id. Objections were made both prior to trial and then again immediately before closing
arguments. Id.
76 Id. at 427. In pertinent part, counsel argued, "This is not a case where we have two plain-
tiffs suing two defendants. This is a case in which the family is trying to get money from the
railroad. Tanya Lacy doesn't want anything from her daughter." Id. The attorney continued,
explaining that a finding that CSX was even one percent negligent would mean that the plaintiffs
could collect the entire damage award from the defendant. Id. Thus, counsel warned:
So when you go back into that jury room and fill out this verdict form, any finding on
the part of CSX, I percent, 10 percent, 50 percent, 100 percent, it's the same thing.
One percent is, in essence, telling CSX, you are completely and totally responsible for
this accident. So you have two choices . . . , [y]ou can find this accident was solely
Cacoe Sullivan's fault, or solely CSX's fault, because any split and they're going to
come looking for us.
Id.
77 Id. at 426.
78 Compare Kaeo v. Davis, 719 P.2d 387, 396 (Haw. 1986); Luna v. Shockey Sheet Metal &
Welding Co., 743 P.2d 61, 64-65 (Idaho 1987); DeCelles v. State ex rel. Dep't of Highways, 795
P.2d 419, 421 (Mont. 1990) (permitting attorneys to inform juries about joint and several liability
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it is generally an abuse of discretion for the trial court to instruct
the jury or permit argument by counsel regarding the operation
of the doctrine of joint and several liability, where the purpose
thereof is to communicate to the jury the potential post-
judgment effect of their assignment of fault.7 9
In so holding, the Court distinguished the rule announced in Adkins v. Whitten,80
which allows the trial court to instruct the jury on the law of comparative negli-
gence.
81
The Court concluded that such argument about potential post-judgment
effects of a verdict is unwarranted, as "a defendant cannot be permitted to argue
against a finding of fault based upon misleading speculation about the possible
ramifications of the doctrine's application. 82  Furthermore, the argument at
issue ignored the fact that CSX would have a right of comparative contribution
against Sullivan, even if it were called on to pay the entire verdict. 83
On appeal, CSX urged that even if this argument should have been dis-
allowed, its admittance was harmless error because the jury nevertheless found
it one percent liable.84 However, because the Court was "left with grave doubts
about the effect of such argument on the jury's findings in this case," it con-
cluded that this was not harmless error and did warrant reversal.85
Thus, practitioners should refrain from arguing the effects of joint and
several liability in closing arguments. Even if the jury is outwardly unmoved by
the merits of the argument, the Court is likely to conclude that this is reversible
error. Furthermore, this argument may be viewed and interpreted more broadly
as a prohibition against "misstatements of law," as it asks the jury to predict
occurrences following the judgment and account for considerations irrelevant to
the merits of the case. Although most cases involving "misstatements of law"
occur in the criminal context, other jurisdictions have recognized that these are
effects, as juries are then likely to be more conscientious about assigning responsibility to defen-
dants), with Gehres v. City of Phoenix, 753 P.2d 174, 176-77 (Ariz Ct. App. 1987); Femanders v.
Marks Constr. of S.C., Inc., 499 S.E.2d 509, 510-11 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); Dranzo v. Winterhalter,
577 A.2d 1349, 1356 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (emphasizing that consideration of joint and several
liability is irrelevant to the jury's fact-finding purpose).
79 Lacy, 520 S.E.2d at 43 1.
80 Adkins v. Whitten, 297 S.E.2d 881 (W. Va. 1982) (allowing circuit courts to instruct the
jury on effects of comparative negligence).
81 Lacy, 520 S.E.2d at 429.
82 ld. at 43 1.
83 Id. at 430 (citing Syl. Pt. 3, Haynes v. City of Nitro, 240 S.E.2d 544 (W. Va. 1977) ("[O]ne
joint tortfeasor is entitled to contribution from another joint tortfeasor, except where the act is
malum in se.")).
84 Id. at 43 1.
85 Id. at 432.
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improper during closing argument. While counsel does have a right to explain
the law, he or she has a duty to do so correctly.86
2. Golden Rule Arguments
A "golden rule" argument "suggests to jurors that they put themselves
in the shoes of one of the parties, and is impermissible because it encourages the
jurors to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on
the evidence. 87 West Virginia adheres to this general rule, as this line of argu-
ment has been widely condemned as improper.88 As usual, in order to preserve
this error for appeal, an objection is required.89
A common example of an argument found to be improper involves an
attorney asking the jury members to place themselves in the position of the
plaintiff and award the amount of damages that they themselves would find suf-
ficient.90 The rationale behind disallowing such an argument is that "the func-
tion of the jury is to decide according to the evidence, not according to how its
members might wish to be treated." 91 The use of hypothetical examples in clos-
ing argument can also violate the golden rule.92
One should be clear, however, that to be deemed impermissible, the ar-
gument must center on financial responsibility and hypothetically request the
jury to consider the amount they would wish to receive under similar circum-
93
stances. That is to say, it is not improper to request the jury members to use
their own common, everyday experiences in order to judge the liability of an
86 Michael J. Ahlen, The Need for Closing Argument Guidelines in Jury Trials, 70 N.D. L.
REV. 95, 105 (1994) (noting that, in closing argument, the lawyer may not misstate the law).
87 Craig Lee Montz, Why Lawyers Continue to Cross the Line in Closing Argument: An Ex-
amination of Federal and State Cases, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 67, 102 (2001).
88 See Ellison v. Wood & Bush Co., 170 S.E.2d 321, 327 (W. Va. 1969) (citing Keathley v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 102 S.E. 244, 249 (W. Va. 1919)).
89 Landers v. Ohio River R.R. Co., 33 S.E. 296, 300 (W. Va. 1899) ("[I]t should be made to
appear that the accused requested, and was refused, an instruction to the jury to disregard the
unauthorized statements of the counsel.") (quoting Syl. Pt. 2, Young v. State, 19 Tex. App. 536
(1885)).
90 See, e.g., Keathley, 102 S.E. at 249. The argument in Keathley was: "You gentlemen of the
jury, put yourselves in the place of the plaintiff. In estimating damages, take into consideration
what amount, under such circumstances, would compensate you if you were a young man in the
bloom of health, with your wife, about to start on the sea of life." Id.
91 P. Lorillard Co. v. Clay, 104 S.E. 384, 390 (Va. 1920).
92 Montz, supra note 87, at 104.
93 See STEVEN LUBET, MODERN TRIAL ADVOCACY: ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE 501 (2d ed. 1997)
(finding it is improper to ask the jury to put itself in the shoes of any of the parties, since this is a
direct appeal to the juror's emotions).
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actor.94 Thus, it is permissible to ask the jury to draw upon their own personal
experiences and knowledge but impermissible to ask them to do so directly.
This creates a confusing, impractical, and rather poorly justified distinction.
When asking the jury members to consider their own experiences, is an attorney
not simply indirectly requesting that the jury members put themselves in the
shoes of the victim? In practice, the outcome is not likely to differ based on the
construction of the question placed before the jury. It may, however, jeopardize
a trial by subjecting it to reversal based on this technicality. Although a plain-
tiff's attorney may want the jury to sympathize with his or her client, such re-
quests for sympathy must not cross this delicate line. Asking the jury to "do
unto others" is simply not proper.
3. References to Insurance Coverage
Rule 411 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence is a long-standing rule
against referring to the insured status of a party at trial.95 This prohibition has
been recognized in numerous opinions.96 In Graham v. Wriston,97 the Court
explained:
[T]he jury should not be apprised in any way that the defendant
is not insured against liability, not only because such fact is
immaterial to any proper issue in the case, but also because of
the tendency such fact may have to cause the jury out of sympa-
thy for the defendant to relieve him improperly from liability, or
to return in favor of the plaintiff a verdict which is inadequate in
amount. 98
Furthermore, if an attorney clearly implies that his or her client is insured, that
too may constitute reversible error.99 In other words, to constitute reversible
error, the suggestion of insurance coverage or the lack thereof need not be ex-
plicit; implicit references are also prohibited.
Even so, the Court has recognized that where the word "insurance" is
inadvertently mentioned at trial and not by design of the plaintiff or his counsel,
94 Montz, supra note 87, at 105.
95 W. VA. R. EVID. 411.
96 See Bradfield v. Bd. of Educ., 36 S.E.2d 512, 516 (W. Va. 1945); Lynch v. Alderton, 20
S.E.2d 657, 659 (W. Va. 1942); Fleming v. Hartrick, 141 S.E. 628, 629 (W. Va. 1928); Atkins v.
Bartlett, 132 S.E. 885, 887 (W. Va. 1926); Wilkins v. Schwartz, 132 S.E. 887, 889 (W. Va. 1926);
Moorefield v. Lewis, 123 S.E. 564, 565 (W. Va. 1924).
97 120 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 1961).
98 Id. at 718.
99 Kaiser v. Hensley, 318 S.E.2d 598, 601 (W. Va. 1983).
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this will not necessarily constitute reversible error. 1°° Furthermore, an attenu-
ated connection between a statement at trial and the issue of insurance coverage
will be insufficient for reversal. 01 As with most of the other impermissible ar-
guments, an objection is ordinarily required in order to preserve the issue for
appeal.
10 2
Nevertheless, where one party introduces his or her financial status, the
other party is free to rebut the assertion with evidence of insurance coverage that
is contrary to the prior testimony. For example, in Wheeler v. Murphy,10 3 the
Court held that the trial court had abused its discretion by refusing to permit
evidence of the torfeasor's liability insurance to rebut the tortfeasor's proffered
evidence of meager finances.' °4 Thus, it appears that if a party voluntarily
places the matter in dispute, the general prohibition against evidence of insur-
ance coverage is abrogated.
4. Arguments Calculated to Inflame
Another impermissible argument is one deemed "calculated to inflame."
The general rule was stated in the seminal Crum case, 0 5 where the Court an-
nounced:
While great latitude is allowed argument of counsel, they
should not be permitted to excite and inflame the minds of the
jury against one of the litigants, nor appeal to their passions and
prejudices, and if, when such an argument is made at the trial
court is appealed to, it fails to take proper steps to correct its ill
tendencies, and an exception is taken at the proper time, it is
good ground for reversing the judgment and setting aside the
verdict. 06
100 Adkins v. Smith, 98 S.E.2d 712, 716 (W. Va. 1957).
101 Pack v. Van Meter, 354 S.E.2d 581, 589 (W. Va. 1986). Here, plaintiff's counsel remarked,
referring to the collective intelligence of the jury, that "we think she put her hands in good hands."
Id. at 589 n.1 3. The trial court found this to be a reference to Allstate Insurance's slogan, "You're
in good hands with Allstate," and ordered a new trial. Id. at 589. On appeal, the Court found this
reference to be too attenuated to warrant a new trial. Id.
102 Id.; see also Johnson v. Dep't. of Motor Vehicles, 318 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 1984); Smith v.
Holloway Constr. Co., 289 S.E.2d 230 (W. Va. 1982); Loar v. Massey, 261 S.E.2d 83 (W. Va.
1979).
103 452 S.E.2d 416 (W. Va. 1994).
104 Id. at 425.
105 Crum v. Ward, 122 S.E.2d 18 (W. Va. 1961).
106 Id. at 26 (quoting 2 M.J., Argument and Conduct of Counsel § 17).
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In application, this appears to be an equitable rule designed to prevent the jury
from deciding the case on something other than neutral facts.
For example, in Peck v. Bez, 10 7 plaintiffs counsel told the jury during
closing argument: "You get a fellow [the defendant] like that who has filched
out eighty thousand dollars from the people over there [the plaintiffs].' 8 De-
fense counsel then objected, to which the trial court remarked to the jury,
"[C]ounsel I think possibly have more or less leeway in regard to things like
that. I do not believe that any statement would be misconstrued by the jury."' 9
On appeal, the Court found these remarks were clearly "designed to prejudice
the jury" and reversed on this error."l0 Further, the Court noted that "[t]he con-
duct of counsel was improper and tended to violate the dignity and integrity of
the trial court... [and] went beyond the scope of the issues which were before
the court and the jury." ''
Similarly, in Groves v. Compton," 2 the Court reversed, finding it error
for defense counsel to state during closing argument that additional parties were
not in the lawsuit because they were friends of the plaintiff." 3 In so doing, the
Court reiterated its established rule that "it is improper for counsel to argue to
the jury why a party has not been brought into the lawsuit or that an absent party
is solely responsible for the accident since the evidence surrounding such a
party's liability has not been fully developed."'" 4 Furthermore, the comment at
issue was contrary to a prior stipulation agreed to by the defense. " 5
Ultimately, the trial court has discretion in determining when counsel's
comments warrant a new trial, and it will not be reversed absent an abuse of this
discretion. 16 For example, in Mackey v. Irisari,' 17 the Court concluded that
although the remark "may not have been appropriate," it did not inflame or
107 Peck v. Bez, 40 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1946).
108 Id. at 10.
109 Id.
110 Id.
III Id. at 10-11.
112 280 S.E.2d 708 (W. Va. 1981).
113 Id. at 712.
114 Id. (citing Gilbert v. Gulf Oil Corp., 175 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1949)); see also City of Wheel-
ing v. John F. Casey Co., 74 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1935); Rapacki v. Pabst, 400 N.E.2d 81 (11. App.
Ct. 1980); Mulvey v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 294 N.E.2d 689 (I11. 1973). This line of argument could
easily be characterized as a separate category, and some jurisdictions recognize it as such. See,
e.g., Bourette v. Dresser Indus. Inc., 481 A.2d 170 (Me. 1984).
115 Peck, 280 S.E.2d at 712.
116 Bd. of Educ. v. Zando, Martin & Milstead, Inc., 390 S.E.2d 796, 811 (W. Va. 1990).
117 445 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1994).
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prejudice "the jury to the extent which would mandate reversal."'"I 8 This type of
appeal seems best reserved for outrageous cases or used as a last resort.
Notably, a wide range of arguments exist that could fall under this cate-
gory. Many such arguments are frequently encountered in criminal law but
could have a carryover application under the right circumstances. In this vein,
other jurisdictions have ruled that it is impermissible for an attorney to attack
opposing counsel in closing," 9 to state personal opinions or beliefs as to issues
in the case, 20 or to question a witness's credibility by using inflammatory lan-
guage.' 2' The latter is representative of a situation in which a lawyer may be
engaged in a wholly permissible line of argument yet get reversed on appeal for
being "inflammatory" before the jury. Because of the potential for confusion
and an inability of attorneys to meaningfully edit their arguments to excise po-
tentially "inflammatory" language, the Court should more concretely explain the
strictures of this prohibition. Without such revision, this impermissible argu-
ment appears to only provide a broad catch-all without any true definition or any
significant likelihood of consistent results.
C. Legally Unsound Arguments
This class of arguments preys on the jury's ignorance of the legal proc-
ess. There are many issues intentionally decided outside the jury's presence,
and it is impermissible for an attorney to breach this confidentiality. Any at-
tempt to persuade the jury by presenting arguments that have previously been
118 Id. at 752. The comment at issue was in reference to a cap on damages and was that
the Legislature did say that for that portion [the non-economic loss], it cannot
exceed one million dollars. And that's a shame that happened recently, be-
cause if ever there was a case that called out for a verdict of several million
dollars, this is it. And it makes me sad that that happened right before this
case.
Id.; see also Skibo v. Shamrock Co., 504 S.E.2d 188 (W. Va. 1998); C.W. Dev., Inc. v. Structures,
Inc., 408 S.E.2d 41 (W. Va. 1991); Parsons v. Norfolk & W. Ry Co., 408 S.E.2d 668 (W. Va.
1991) (arguing that the plaintiff's only means of recovery was through the Federal Employers
Liability Act was held insufficient to warrant a new trial where the court prevented further com-
ment and where there was no mention of workers' compensation benefits).
119 See Montz, supra note 87, at 105-06. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that
accusing the opposition of engaging in "half-truths," "untruths," "threatening witnesses," and
referring to an adversarial witness as a "second-class expert" constituted reversible error in a
medical malpractice action. See Pesek v. Univ. Neurologist's Ass'n Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1011 (Ohio
2000).
120 See State v. Stephens, 525 S.E.2d 301, 306 (W. Va. 1999) (reversing conviction where trial
court denied defendant's motion for mistrial after prosecutor suggested to the jury that defense
counsel believed the defendant was guilty). For application in civil cases, see, for example, Deje-
sus v. Flick, 7 P.3d 459 (Nev. 2000). See also LUBET, supra note 93, at 496 (quoting MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e)).
121 Montz supra note 87, at 114.
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addressed by the court should be strictly avoided, as the introduction of such
arguments may only serve to confuse the merits of the case.
1. Arguing Facts Not in Evidence
Arguing outside of the evidence is the most common source of objec-
tion during closing argument.122 "Though wide latitude is accorded counsel in
arguments before a jury, such arguments may not be founded on facts not before
the jury, or inferences which must arise from facts not before the jury.' 23 The
widely accepted rule, stated more succinctly, is that although attorneys are af-
forded wide latitude, that latitude should have some logical nexus in deduction
or analogy to the evidence and facts.' 24 Therefore, even in the context of closing
arguments, counsel must be cautious to avoid making arguments based on facts
not reasonably placed before the jury. This rule is quite important; inferences to
be drawn from the facts in a case have been referred to as "the key to making an
effective closing argument."'
2 5
In Gardner v. CSX Transportation Company,'2 6 the defendant sought to
reverse the trial court's ruling that had prevented the defendant from arguing to
the jury that it could infer that the plaintiff's conduct was intentional. 2 7 At is-
sue in the case was the plaintiff s car, which had stalled on the defendant's rail-
way crossing and was hit by a train. 128 Counsel for the defense sought to argue
that the plaintiff had intentionally placed his car on the tracks because the vehi-
cle may have had more value in this demolished state than it did when it was
operational. 29 Specifically, the argument sought to be advanced by defense
counsel was that "the tragic 'coincidence' that this vehicle happened to stall
directly astraddle these railroad tracks at the precise moment a train was ap-
proaching is in and of itself cause to question the motive of plaintiff Belcher."', 30
Counsel also mentioned that the plaintiff had admitted filing and receiving a
claim on the damaged automobile.' 3' However, the Court found that the trial
122 Id. at 102.
123 Jenrett v. Smith, 315 S.E.2d 583, 591 (W. Va. 1983) (quoting Syl. Pt. 3, Crum v. Ward, 122
S.E.2d 18, 19 (W. Va. 1961)).
124 E.g., Wright & Ford Millworks v. Long, 412 So. 2d 892, 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
125 Montz, supra note 87, at 96 (quoting James H. Seckinger, Closing Argument, 19 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 51 (1995)).
126 498 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1997).
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court had not erred in prohibiting such an argument, finding that this line of
reasoning was "not supported by any facts presented to the jury."' 3
2
Simply put, "[a] jury will not be permitted to base its findings of fact
upon conjecture or speculation."'' 33 Thus, closing arguments based on facts or
evidence not presented at trial or on unreasonable inferences may prove the ba-
sis for prejudicial error and reversal on appeal. This argument is objectionable
because the purpose of closing argument is to persuade the jury with the evi-
dence admitted at trial. 134 Unsupported remarks amount to unsworn testimony
that is not subjected to cross-examination, an idea contrary to the West Virginia
justice system.
2. Denial of Motion for Directed Verdict
It is highly improper for counsel to argue before the jury that the court
denied opposing counsel's motion to direct a verdict or that the court submitted
the case to the jury after considering the losing party's motion.' 35 In the absence
of corrective action, such a tactic is viewed as highly prejudicial, thereby neces-
sitating the issuance of a new trial.
136
In West Virginia, this rule was recognized in Arnoldt v. Ashland Oil
137
when the Court explained that "counsel is prohibited from arguing to a jury that
the court has denied a party's motion for directed verdict or that the court sub-
mitted the case to the jury after considering and rejecting such a motion.' 38 In
this case, plaintiffs counsel, over the defendant's objection, essentially revealed
to the jury that the defense counsel had moved the court to dismiss the suit,
which Judge Kaufman denied.139 Thus, reasoned plaintiff s counsel, "we've met
the burden, at least for your consideration."' 40 Plaintiffs counsel also made
mention of the fact that none of the members of the jury were trained in the law
or had experience as jurists. 14' This clear attempt to appeal to the jury on the
basis of the judge's expert opinion of the case was held to be reversible error. 42
132 Id.
133 Syl. Pt. 1, Oates v. Cont'i Ins. Co., 72 S.E.2d 886, 887 (W. Va. 1973); see also Adams v.
Sparacio, 196 S.E.2d 647, 652 (W. Va. 1973).
134 See LUBET, supra note 93, at 496.
135 See P.A. Agabin, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Counsel's Argument or
Comment as to Trial Judge's Refusal to Direct Verdict Against Him, 10 A.L.R.3d 1330, 1332
(1966).
136 See id. at 1335.
137 412 S.E.2d 795 (W. Va. 1991).
138 Id. at 809 (citing Agabin, supra note 135, at 1332).
139 Id. at 810.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 809.
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In general, it would be wise to refrain from informing the jury of a
judge's rulings. The language in Arnoldt makes clear that the Court looks quite
disfavorably upon arguments suggesting the jury follow the "expert's" lead.
This rule is sound, as it truly seems unfair for an attorney to apprise the jury of a
judge's ruling. Without legal training, the opportunity for misunderstanding is
great.
3. Argument Counter to In Limine Ruling
Although not limited only to closing arguments, an attorney's violation
of the trial court's ruling on an in limine motion may serve as reversible error.
The Court in Honaker v. Mahon143 stated as much when it ruled that "a deliber-
ate and intentional violation of a trial court's ruling on a motion in limine, and
thereby the intentional introduction of prejudicial evidence into a trial, is a
ground for reversing a jury's verdict."' 44 Furthermore, the Court stated such a
violation may constitute plain error, thus alleviating the necessity for objection
on the matter to preserve the issue on appeal. 1
45
However, the trial court's decision will, nonetheless, be afforded sig-
nificant deference and will only be reversed if counsel's remarks are "reasona-
bly calculated to cause, and probably did cause" the jury to enter an improper
judgment in the case.146 Additionally, counsel for either the plaintiff or defen-
dant would be well advised not to violate such a ruling. In addition to poten-
tially jeopardizing the outcome of the case at hand, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has reminded trial courts that a party who violates a motion in
limine is subject to all legally available sanctions, including contempt . 47
There is a split of authority in federal and state courts on whether a mo-
tion in limine preserves an error for appeal or whether further objection is ne-
cessitated. 48 However, in Wimer v. Hinkle,149 the West Virginia Supreme Court
142 Id. at 810.
143 552 S.E.2d 788 (W. Va. 2001).
144 Id. at 796.
145 Id. at 795. The Court went on to list the necessary elements in order to constitute plain
error, including the existence of "(1) an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affects substantial rights;
and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings."
Id.
146 Foster v. Sakhai, 559 S.E.2d 53, 67 (W. Va. 2001).
147 Honaker, 552 S.E.2d at 797 n.8. Plaintiffs counsel apparently sought to alert the Court of a
growing trend by defense counsel to interject prejudicial remarks in closing arguments in order to
get "a losing case" thrown out at plaintiffs expense. Id.
148 Compare Rojas v. Richardson, 703 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1983) reh'g granted and vacated by
713 F.2d 116 (1983) (stating motion in limine does not preserve error for appeal); Northwestern
Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bro. Mfg. Co., 679 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1982); Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621
F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Helina, 549 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1977); People v. Stewart,
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concluded that an objection is not ordinarily necessary." 0 Even so, if there is a
"significant change in the basis for admitting the evidence," an objection may be
required. 5 ' As a practical consideration, it may be wise to object again at trial
so as to avoid the possibility that the Court would find "significantly changed
circumstances" and refuse to hear the argument on appeal.
Overall, it appears this rule is sound. An argument counter to an in
limine ruling ultimately constitutes arguing facts not in evidence. Further, even
if counsel disagrees with the judge's pretrial ruling, it seems best to argue that
point on appeal, if necessary, rather than compound the problem.
IV. CONCLUSION
Overall, impermissible arguments in West Virginia offer the Court an
invitation to engage in line-drawing. Where the Court feels the case has been
decided justly, it need only cite the "considerable discretion" afforded the trial
court or note that the argument at issue was not "sufficiently prejudicial" to war-
rant a new trial. However, where the Court wishes to reverse the result reached
below, it will not hesitate in finding an argument "speculative," "inflammatory,"
or "prejudicial." Thus, it becomes difficult to predict with any degree of cer-
tainty whether the Court will find a particular argument to be reversible; this
area of the law will most definitely be decided on a case-by-case basis. Never-
theless, it may be wise to add an appellate argument based upon the opposition's
closing on the chance that the Court may find that a particular set of facts and
circumstances tends to produce "manifest injustice."
Practitioners should be aware that many of the cases that include an ap-
peal concerning the substance of summation address the issue in no more than a
few sentences with little to no analysis.' 52 Thus, many of the outrageous antics
that one may expect to find addressed by the Court are likely dealt with at the
trial court level and elicit no discussion on appeal. In any event, it would be
189 Cal. Rptr. 141 (Ct. App. 1983); Douglas v. Lombardino, 693 P.2d 1138 (Kan. 1985); Maricle
v. Spiefel, 329 N.W.2d 80 (Neb. 1983); State v. Leslie, 471 N.E.2d 503 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984);
Zehner v. Post Oak Oil Co., 640 P.2d 991 (Okla. Ct. App. 1981); Dailey v. Wheat, 681 S.W.2d
747 (Tex. App. 1984); State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79 (Utah 1983), with Am. Home Assurance Co.
v. Sunshine Supermarket, Inc., 753 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1985) (motion in limine preserves error for
appeal); Sheehy v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 631 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1980); Reyes v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co.,
589 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Williams, 561 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Loof v.
Sanders, 686 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1984); State v. Lujan, 666 P.2d 71 (Ariz. 1983); Harley-Davidson
Motor Co. v. Daniel, 260 S.E.2d 20 (Ga. 1979); State v. Foster, 674 P.2d 587 (Or. 1983); State v.
Kelly, 685 P.2d 564 (Wash. 1984).
149 379 S.E.2d 383 (W. Va. 1989).
150 Id. at 386.
151 Id.
152 See, e.g., Given v. Field, 484 S.E.2d 647, 652 (W. Va. 1997); Perdomo v. Stevens, 476
S.E.2d 223, 225 n.5 (W. Va. 1996).
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most helpful if the Court would engage in a more thorough analysis of these
issues when presented. Absent such analysis, it simply appears that the Court
acts as an ultimate fact-finder.
Brian J. Headley*
J.D. Candidate, West Virginia University College of Law, May 2004.
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